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Dimsey was an accountant resident in 
Jersey. He helped an avionics engineer 
called Chipping supply equipment to 
South Africa in breach of sanctions. 
Dimsey, Chipping, Chipping's solicitor Da 
Costa and a business associate called Alien 
were all convicted of cheating the public 
revenue and sent to prison. Dimsey's and 
Alien's sentences were for 18 months and 
7 years respectively. Alien was also ordered 
to pay £3m, with a consecutive 7 years' 
imprisonment in default.
Dimsey and Alien appealed against 
their convictions. These appeals were 
heard in the Criminal Division of the 
Court of Appeal, where the appellants 
were represented by well-known tax 
barristers, including Robert Venables QC 
and James Kessler. Their technical tax 
arguments did not carry much weight 
with the criminal judges. By directing 
their attack through the criminal courts, 
the Revenue almost certainly obtained 
rulings on several issues which were 
more favourable to them than might haveo
been expected had the points been 
argued elsewhere.
The Revenue will not be slow to 
exploit this in a number of areas where 
there has for some time been a stalemate 
on the technical arguments.
This short article summarises the 
important issues decided in the judgment 
of 7 July 1999 (R v Dimsey (Dermont 
Jeremy) CA [1999] STC 846).
DECEPTION
The court found that both appellants 
had positively misled the Revenue
investigators. This is what led to the 
criminal charges.
Some of the untruths related to sums 
of money which were not disclosed; 
some related to the way in which the 
business had been started and had no 
impact on tax liability as such. For 
example, it was claimed that Dimsey 
contacted Chipping, rather than the 
other way round. In particular the 
Revenue were able to show that Chipping 
had withheld information even when 
giving a certificate of full disclosure.
o o
These deceptions gave the Revenue the 
opportunity to press criminal charges.
COMPANY CONTROL
Dimsey administered 13 companies 
for Alien in Jersey. These held a portfolio 
of properties. The question was whether 
the companies were centrally managed 
and controlled by Dimsey in Jersey or 
Alien in the UK. The text of the 
judgment speaks for itself on this issue 
and should be read in full, but the 
following extracts are significant:
o o
'The companies were administered by Dimsey 
Jor Alien in accordance with Alien's instructions. 
Dimsey and his office undertook administrative 
work relating to the offshore companies and 
Alien's personal assets. It was the prosecution 
case that Alien himself managed and controlled 
the companies in the UK.
Numerous draft letters were recovered showing 
that Alien was giving instructions to Dimsey to 
send letters on behalf of the offshore companies.
When Alien's home was searched there were 
Jbund numerous detailed cash statements ... 
cheque books in respect of the companies where 
blank cheques had been signed by the authorised 
signatories, and bank statements of the 
companies annotated by Alien.
The house in which the Alien Jamily lived was 
held in the name ofPeche d'Or. Alien and 
members of his Jamily had credit cards in the 
name oj Meldrette and Peche d'Or which were 
used to pay household and personal bills and Jor 
holidays and education. SchoolJees Jor Jour of 
Alien's children were paid by Peche d'Or.'
Against this damning evidence Alien 
did not appeal the question of control.
Dimsey, however, submitted that the trial 
judge had misdirected the jury on the 
test for determining whether some ofo
Chipping's companies were UK resident.
The Appeal Court agreed that some 
aspects of the summing up could have 
been misleading but took the view that
o
the overall result was correct.
'Thejactual issues in the case centred on 
the question whether it was Air Dimsey who 
managed and controlled the companies, with 
Air Chipping merely acting as a consultant 
who undertook work in England on behalf oj 
the companies. ... So long as the prosecution 
could satisfy the jury so that it was sure that 
Air Chipping was not a consultant but injact 
not only undertook the day-to-day running oj 
the business but made all the decisions whilst 
Mr Dimsey carried out the Junctions of 
administration in Jersey, no sophisticated or 
difficult questions oj central management and 
control arose.'
The Appeal Court approved the 
following passage from the trial judge:
'The prosecution case is that Mr Chipping 
was really the linchpin of the whole business, 
that he had both the technical expertise and 
the business and financial knowledge to 
negotiate and carry out these contracts. They 
say that effectively he simply used Thomlyn 
and Glenville to do his business Jor him, that 
those companies were just convenient Jacades 
or fronts set up Jor the purpose. The defence 
case is that those companies were or at least 
may have been genuine trading companies 
controlled at least in Jersey and that Mr 
Chipping was merely a consultant.'
The court went on to refer to the way 
in which the business had been done:
'It emerged that Air Dimsey signed the 
contracts, arranged for Air Alien's commission 
to be collectedJrom the bank, chased late 
payments and dealt with invoices.
... The question oj control by shareholders 
oja company was never argued before the 
jury. It was never mentioned by the judge. 
Accordingly we do not think that it would ever 
have occurred to the jury to conclude that 
because Air Chipping was the benejicial owner 
oj the shares in the company those companies 
were resident in the UK ...'
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DUTY TO DISCLOSE
The Taxes Management Act 1970 requires 
a company which is chargeable to 
corporation tax to give notice to the 
Revenue that it is so chargeable. Of 
course none of the Chipping or Alien 
offshore companies had done so, it being 
assumed there was no liability in the first 
place. This obligation falls on the 'proper 
officer', usually the company secretary or 
the person acting as company secretary.
It was submitted that as neither 
Chipping nor Alien was an officer of their 
respective companies they could not be 
fixed with any criminal or other liability 
for the failure to comply with this 
statutory obligation. This was dismissed:
'In our judgment this has no merits. It is 
obvious that any failure by the proper officer 
to perform his ... duty cannot relieve the 
company of its obligation to corporation tax. 
... If an indhidual having total de facto 
control of a company, arranges its affairs so 
that the company (a) makes profits but (b) 
does not declare them to the Revenue, he is 
obviously cheating the Revenue ..."
"... the offence of cheating is perfectly simple: 
it is constituted by any form offraudulent 
conduct having the purpose and effect of 
depriving the Revenue of money due to it. In 
any event it is simply artificial, on the facts we 
have recounted, to suggest these were cases cf 
mere omission. These were deliberate plots, 
involving oven acts in the way of correspondence 
and so forth, to bring about a state of affairs in 
which the Revenue was to be defrauded.'
SECTION 739
The argument was advanced on behalf 
of the appellants that, as the offshore 
income of the companies was potentially 
liable to tax in the hands of the UK- 
resident individuals who had 'power to 
enjoy' it under the Income and Corporation 
Taxes Act 1988 s. 739(2), it should not also 
be liable to corporation tax. If so then 
neither Dimsey nor Alien could be 
convicted of any corporation tax offences.
Robert Venables QC made the point 
that if the income is deemed to be that of 
one taxpayer (the individual), it is only 
logical to assume it cannot at the same 
time be that of another (the company). 
This ingenious line of argument was 
dismissed by the Court of Appeal on the 
narrow ground that s. 739 deems offshore 
income in such a case to be the income of 
the individual taxpayer 'for all the 
purposes of the Income Tax Acts' and does
not therefore extend to corporation tax.
It was also pointed out on behalf of the 
Crown that Venables' argument on this 
point might enable corporation tax owed 
by a profitable company to be avoided by 
fixing it on an impecunious individual.
The court realised it might be leading 
towards a conclusion which would allow- 
the same income to be taxed twice and 
made the following useful comments:
' ... There is a theoretical liability to 
double taxation. We were told the practice is 
not to exact tax twice. We wholly accept that 
the subject is not to be taxed by discretion. 
Were a situation to arise in which, contrary to 
their plain statement to this court, the 
Revenue sought in as. 739 case to exact tax 
both from the transferor (or other person with 
'power to enjoy') and the offshore transferee, 
the High Court might be invited to prohibit it 
as an abuse of power.'
SHADOW DIRECTORS
Alien and members of his family 
occupied properties owned by some of 
the offshore companies and the Revenue 
raised additional assessments against him 
on the ground that he was in effect a 
director of these companies and 
therefore taxable on the use of the 
properties as a benefit in kind.
The tax at stake here can be significant. 
It is based on a simple calculation of the 
cost of the property to the company over 
£75,000, multiplied by an interest factor 
(currently 6.25 per cent). So where, for 
example, a company has spent 
£2,075,000 on the acquisition and 
improvement of the property the 
additional income will be £125,000, 
taxable at 40 per cent, giving rise to tax of 
£50,000 p.a..
This is the intended result of 
provisions introduced to tax a UK 
director provided with the use of 
expensive accommodation at the cost of 
his emplover. The Revenue have 
attempted for some years to apply this 
legislation to offshore property-owning 
companies, but until now there has been 
great uncertainty as to whether the 
legislation supported this where the 
taxpayer concerned was not actually 
appointed a director or other officer of 
the offshore company.
In order to recover tax in such 
situations the Revenue have alleged that a 
person who has no formal position in the
company may nonetheless be chargeable 
if he comes within the definition of a 
shadow director   i.e. 'someone in 
accordance with whose instructions the 
company is accustomed to act'. Until the 
Dimsey/Allen appeal, the balance of the 
argument was running against the 
Revenue. In a case before the Special 
Commissioners the point was decided 
against the Revenue on the question, 
whether the taxpayer concerned could be 
regarded as a shadow director, but the 
court went on to say it had no confidence 
in the argument. The Appeal Court's 
decision in Dimsey has changed the 
position dramatically in the Revenue's 
favour. This will lead to considerable 
problems for foreign families who have 
traditionally owned UK property through 
offshore companies. Each case will have 
to be reviewed on its own facts, but a 
number of general points can be made:
(1) It may be more difficult for the 
Revenue to apply their provisions 
where no member of the family with 
any real influence over the property 
is currently UK resident.
(2) There should be no problem where 
the only UK resident members of 
the family in occupation of the 
property are not directors and do 
not act as if they are directors. This 
means making sure that other 
people not resident in the UK 
positively do act as directors and it 
can be shown that they make all the 
important decisions outside the UK.
(3) Care should be taken not to convert 
a situation in which the reality is that 
the company has been controlled by 
individuals resident in the UK to 
one where it is not. This is because 
the actions of a 'shadow director' 
may have resulted in the company 
becoming treated as UK resident. 
The Dimsey tests on this should be 
borne in mind. If there is a risk of 
this then there are two more 
complications to consider:
(a) It is a criminal offence for a UK 
resident company to be taken 
non-UK resident without 
Treasury consent. This is a 
hangover from exchange
o O
control, which was withdrawn 
in 1979. But the section 
requiring Treasury consent 
remains in force. It now serves 
an information-gathering role
o O
for the government. 21
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(b) The change from UK to non- 
UK resident status results in a 
deemed CGT disposal by the 
company of all its assets, against 
which it will not be possible to 
claim principal private 
residence (PPR) relief.
(4) It should be considered in each case 
whether the property really was 
owned by the company beneficially or 
whether the company was just a 
nominee for the real owner. There 
should be no attempt to rewrite 
history here, but frequently the 
company has acted as no more than a 
nominee and the value of the property 
has never been treated in its accounts 
or otherwise as an asset of the 
company. If this treatment is applied 
it should be appreciated that the 
company will not have provided any 
protection for a non-domiciled 
owner, or trust made by such a 
person, from UK Inheritance Tax.
THE SHAM TRUST POINT
Alien left out of statements to the 
Revenue about the extent of his assets all 
those held by two offshore discretionary 
trusts. His argument was that he had no 
need to disclose these assets because they 
belonged to the trusts, not to him.
The Crown Court judge .had directed 
the jury in the following terms:
'But here the question is, was Air Alien the 
beneficial owner, the true owner of the shares, 
the properties and the bank balances in 
question? If he was then clearly the schedule 
of assets which he provided to the Revenue in 
answer to their enquiries was entirely wrong. 
If he appreciated that he should have declared 
them to the Revenue, then he was cheating 
the Revenue by Jailing to do so ...
... the assets belonged to the trusts unless 
you are satisfied that the various very lengthy 
trust deeds you have seen are a sham, that is 
to say, documents which purport to show a 
legal situation which is other than the real 
one; intending to give the appearance of 
creating legal rights different from the actual 
legal rights. If these trust deeds are a sham 
then it is open to you tojind that the 
defendant was the beneficial owner of the 
various assets, knew that he was, and was 
cheating the Revenue in not disclosing ...
... it is said to you that the various deeds are 
perfectly standard discretionary trusts. Yes and 
no. No doubt they are in a form veryjrequently 
used, but you have seen that the only named
beneficiaries are the Red Cross and Oxfam. You 
have seen that the trustees of each trust have 
power to appoint additional beneficiaries ... you 
may think it extremely unusual for a person who 
is really wanting to put money into a trust not 
to specify at least the classes of people whom it is 
intended to benefit ...
... if you were to conclude ... that in 
practice Mr Alien used any monies or assets 
belonging to any of the various companies as 
if they were his own then ... that would be an 
indication that the various trusts do not set 
out the true position. An owner of things is 
the person generally who has the say so about 
what happens to them. You are entitled to say 
whether you keep your motor car or you sell it 
for instance ... if you concluded that Mr Alien 
actually did whatever he liked with any of the 
assets or monies of any cf these companies 
that would be powerful evidence that these 
documents, lengthy as they are, are ... simply 
pieces cf paper.'
The Court of Appeal agreed that the 
judge should not have suggested therej o oo
was anything sinister in the drafting of 
the documents or the existence of bearer 
shares, but concluded that in the context 
of the whole situation the right directions
O
had been given to the jury:
'The plain fact is that if the jury found that 
Alien was the beneficial owner of the assets in 
question, they must inevitably have convicted
him ...
... there was, in fact, overwhelming evidence 
that the assets were Alien's to dispose of as he 
would, that he treated them as such, and that 
there was no question of the trustees 
possessing any real power or discretion in the 
matter.'
Alien's Counsel had one last try. He 
submitted that if the arrangements were
O
sham then the existence of the 
companies (and thus all the corporation 
tax penalties) could be ignored on the 
basis that the assets should only be taxed 
as Alien's personal property. This was 
dismissed by the Appeal Court, which 
held that the sham led to Alien being 
treated as owning the companies, not 
their underlying assets. There would 
seem to be some inconsistency between 
this and the trial judge's views quoted 
above about Alien treating the company 
assets as his own. Also there is nothing in 
the judgment to indicate Alien was given 
the slightest benefit of the doubt that he 
was relying on advice, however 
misguided, to the effect that these 
arrangements might work.
CONCLUSION
The Revenue have collected more 
ammunition in the course of this one 
series of cases than could ever have been 
envisaged when their investigators first 
began questioning Chipping.
It is also interesting to note that the 
investigation was started as a result of 
information passed to the UK Inland 
Revenue by the German authorities. 
Exchange of information on tax-sensitive 
matters has been commonplace within 
Europe for many years, but the pace at 
which this happens will undoubtedly 
increase as the G7 and OECD focus 
more on tax avoidance and evasion.
The use of the criminal courts led to a 
robust no-nonsense approach to abstruse 
technical tax questions. Points raised by 
the tax barristers would have been given 
more consideration in the Chancery 
Division, where the argument would have 
taken place had the Revenue not had such 
clear evidence of deceit. Points scored in 
this context will however now be brought 
to bear in situations where there is not the 
slightest trace of criminal behaviour.
The result is that more care than ever 
needs to be taken by those who use 
offshore trust and company vehicles to 
ensure they are real. This means:
  using reputable, independent trustees 
and taking the risk that they may not 
always do what is expected of them;
  appointing real people, with knowledge 
and business skills, to be directors;
  making sure decisions are taken
O
outside the UK when that is relevant;
  avoiding drafting up minutes in theo or
UK for use overseas;
  maintaining careful records of the 
decision-making process overseas;
  avoiding the use of 'black hole' trusts, 
nominee directors and such devices;
  recognising that a purposeful omission 
to act may be held against you; and
  responding truthfully to enquiries.
Some people may see all this as the 
bureaucrats moving the goal posts 
without warning. Let no one say after 
reading this that they haven't been 
warned. Perhaps it is no coincidence that 
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